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INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was 
particularly active in trademark matters.  Seventeen opinions, 
covering topics as diverse as adult-oriented conversations and 
mistaken identity, confirmed established precedent and provided 
new insights.1  The Federal Circuit set new standards for both 
scandalous and geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks.2  
The court also considered the dilution doctrine in the face of the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, 
Inc.3  The Federal Circuit has thus provided trademark lawyers and 
their clients with a wealth of guidance and change. 
I. SCANDALOUS MARKS:  DICTIONARY EVIDENCE ALONE SUPPORTS A  
REFUSAL TO REGISTER UNDER SECTION 2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT 
Although dictionaries have long held evidentiary value in 
trademark cases,4 especially those involving refusals to register based 
                                                          
 1. Cent. Mfg. Co. v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 22977469 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003); In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 
1356, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re MBNA America Bank, N.A., 
340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Pacer Tech., 338 
F.3d 1348, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Custom Computer Servs., 
Inc. v. Paychex Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Savin Corp., No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775 
(Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003); Lowell Int’l Co. v. Quimby, No. 02-1392, 2003 WL 2138662 
(Fed. Cir. June 4, 2003); Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 
330 F.3d 1333, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 958 
(2003); In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072 
(Fed. Cir. May 1, 2003); In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC, Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003 
WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003); In re Dayan, No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003); In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 2. See Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1341, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478 (finding 
dictionary definitions sufficient to support refusal to register a “scandalous” mark 
when the definitions of the mark categorize the word as vulgar and the applicant’s 
use is limited to the vulgar meaning); see also California Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1340, 
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (holding that to deny an application for geographically 
deceptively misdescriptiveness, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) now must also show that the goods-place association is material to the 
consumer’s purchasing decision). 
 3. 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that federal law requires proof of actual 
dilution—rather than a likelihood of dilution—by objective proof of actual injury to 
the economic value of the trademark). 
 4. See, e.g., In re American Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1832, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the PTO can meet its evidentiary 
burden by relying on dictionary definitions); In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 
1018-19, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (referencing dictionaries 
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on scandalous marks,5 the Federal Circuit previously avoided 
determining whether such evidence alone is sufficient to support a 
refusal to register a mark under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act6 
when a term has no alternative meaning.  Instead, past Federal 
Circuit decisions left “for another day” whether refusals based on a 
mark’s scandalous nature could be supported only by dictionary 
evidence in the absence of alternative definitions.7  In In re Boulevard 
Entertainment, Inc.,8 the Federal Circuit finally resolved this open 
question.9 
The applicant in Boulevard offered adult entertainment services, 
specifically telephone services in which actors and actresses held 
“adult” conversations with customers.10  Boulevard provided these 
services under the name “1-800-JACK-OFF” to over 1.2 million 
customers per year.11  In 1998, Boulevard applied to register “1-800-
JACK-OFF” for telephone entertainment services and filed an intent-
to-use application for “JACK OFF” for the same services.12  The 
examining attorney refused to register these marks on the ground 
that they included immoral and scandalous material.13 
The examining attorney relied on four dictionaries, all of which 
defined “jack-off” as a vulgar and offensive reference to 
masturbation.14  Although Boulevard provided Lexis-Nexis search 
results for “jack-off” to show that the mark was not vulgar, the 
examining attorney disregarded that evidence as either unrelated or 
as supportive of the offensive nature of the marks.15  On appeal, the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirmed, and 
Boulevard timely appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.16 
The most important issue on appeal was whether the examining 
attorney improperly relied upon only dictionary definitions when 
refusing Boulevard’s applications.17  Although the Federal Circuit had 
previously determined that dictionary definitions alone are 
                                                          
to determine whether the term “wipe” is a commonly used generic term). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1372-74, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1923, 1927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on dictionary definitions to establish 
whether a mark constitutes scandalous matter under the Lanham Trademark Act). 
 6. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000). 
 7. Mavety, 33 F.3d 1367 at 1374, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928. 
 8. 334 F.3d 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 9. Id. at 1340-41, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477-78. 
 10. Id. at 1338, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77. 
 11. Id. at 1339, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477. 
 12. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477. 
 13. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477. 
 14. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477. 
 15. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. 
 16. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. 
 17. Id. at 1340, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477. 
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insufficient to support a section 2(a) refusal when a term has 
multiple meanings, some of which are non-vulgar and pertinent,18 it 
had not previously reached the issue of whether dictionary 
definitions by themselves could be a sufficient basis for refusal when 
there are no alternative, non-vulgar meanings.  In light of the facts at 
issue, the court answered this question in the affirmative.19  
Specifically, the court held that: 
In a case such as this one, in which multiple dictionaries, including 
at least one standard dictionary, uniformly indicate that a word is 
vulgar, and the applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the 
vulgar meaning of the word, . . . the PTO can sustain its burden of 
showing that the mark comprises or consists of scandalous matter 
by reference to dictionary definitions alone.  In such instances, 
although other evidence, such as consumer surveys, would no 
doubt be instructive, the PTO’s finding is not legally insufficient 
because of the absence of such evidence.20 
The court thus held that dictionary definitions alone are sufficient 
to support a refusal under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) when the definitions 
all categorize the word as vulgar and the applicant’s use is limited to 
the vulgar meaning.21 
The court was also quick to distinguish the facts at issue in 
Boulevard with those in In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., another well-
known Federal Circuit case that involved an application to register 
the mark “BLACK TAIL” for an adult magazine featuring 
photographs of partially and completely nude African American 
women.22  The Boulevard court noted that the “BLACK TAIL” decision 
involved a double entendre because the term could be understood as 
either a vulgar reference to a female sexual partner or a non-vulgar 
reference to buttocks.23  The term “jack-off,” however, was not a 
double entendre because all dictionary definitions noted that the 
term was vulgar and Boulevard’s use of the term was “clearly limited 
to the vulgar meaning,”24 and thus distinguishable from the use of the 
term at issue in Mavety Media Group.25 
                                                          
 18. See In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1923, 1928 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that the Board erroneously concluded that the 
public would associate the applicant’s mark with its vulgar meaning rather than its 
non-vulgar meaning). 
 19. Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1340-41, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478. 
 20. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478 (internal citations omitted). 
 21. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478. 
 22. Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1368-69, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923-24. 
 23. Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1341, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478. 
 24. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478. 
 25. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478. 
The court also addressed several other issues.  Boulevard argued that the 
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The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Boulevard has provided much-
needed precedent in the area of scandalous and immoral marks.  
With the holding that dictionary definitions alone may suffice for a 
refusal in certain circumstances, the Federal Circuit has provided 
more guidance to aid applicants in choosing and applying to register 
questionable marks. 
II. DILUTION AND PRIOR USE 
Since Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1999 to allow 
oppositions based on dilution,26 several issues have arisen regarding 
when such oppositions are appropriate.  In Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. 
Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc.,27 the Federal Circuit determined that, 
before bringing an opposition based on dilution, a trademark owner 
must demonstrate that its mark was famous prior to the applicant’s 
use,28 even if the applicant’s use was limited to a specific geographic 
area,29 and that state dilution law cannot be the basis for a dilution 
opposition.30 
In Enterprise, Advantage Rent-A-Car produced a television 
commercial in 1990 with the phrase “We’ll Even Pick You Up.”31  
Advantage aired the commercial approximately one hundred times 
                                                          
examining attorney relied on outdated dictionary definitions.  Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1478.  To demonstrate that dictionary definitions are outdated and not 
reflective of community standards, the court advised that applicants present either a 
more current, “authoritative” dictionary that provides a different definition of the 
meaning or acceptability of the word or to “make a persuasive showing” that the 
dictionary definition does not reflect community views through “other” unspecified 
evidence.  Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.  The court determined that Boulevard’s 
evidence, which consisted of declarations of personal opinions as to the vulgarity of 
the term and media references discussing masturbation in general and the term 
“jerk-off,” was clearly insufficient.  Id. at 1341-42, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. 
The court also addressed Boulevard’s argument that the examining attorney relied 
on only a small percentage of Lexis-Nexis results without providing the search 
criteria or noting that they were representative results.  Id. at 1342, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1479.  The court did not address this issue in depth, and simply noted that 
any error was harmless.  Id. at 1342-43, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. 
Finally, the court briefly addressed Boulevard’s First Amendment and Due Process 
arguments before rejecting them.  Id. at 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480. 
 26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2000) (stating that a party may file an opposition to 
registration based on dilution of the distinctiveness of the opposing party’s mark); see 
also DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK:  TACTICS AND PRACTICE 182 (3d ed. 
1999) (defining dilution as the “use of a highly distinctive mark by someone other 
than its owner in a manner that tends to blur its distinctiveness or tarnish its image”). 
 27. 330 F.3d 1333, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 958 (Dec. 15, 2003). 
 28. See id. at 1334-35, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. 
 29. Id. at 1335, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. 
 30. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 31. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
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in the San Antonio, Texas area from 1992 through 1995.32  Advantage 
broadened the scope of the television commercial from August 1997 
to April 1998 when it aired the commercial 289 more times in 
Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas.33 
In 1994, Enterprise Rent-A-Car began a national advertising 
campaign using similar slogans, such as “Pick the Company that Picks 
You Up” and “Pick Enterprise, We’ll Pick You Up.”34  After two years’ 
use, Enterprise received trademark registrations for “PICK 
ENTERPRISE, WE’LL PICK YOU UP,” “PICK THE COMPANY THAT 
PICKS YOU UP,” and “WE’LL PICK YOU UP.”35 
After several years of use by both parties, Advantage sued 
Enterprise in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Texas for unfair competition under federal and state law and for 
cancellation of Enterprise’s registrations.36  Enterprise responded 
with a counterclaim for federal and state unfair competition and 
trademark dilution.37  After the parties entered into a partial consent 
judgment finding no likelihood of confusion regarding the unfair 
competition claims,38 the district court ruled against Enterprise on its 
dilution claims after determining that its trademarks were not 
sufficiently famous under either federal or state law.39  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding on the federal dilution 
claim but remanded the state dilution claim, holding that state law 
required only distinctiveness, not fame.40 
During the district court litigation, Advantage filed a federal 
trademark for the disputed “WE’LL EVEN PICK YOU UP” mark.41  
After the Fifth Circuit held that Enterprise’s marks were not famous 
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”),42 the Board 
dismissed Enterprise’s opposition and held that Enterprises’ FTDA 
claim was barred by res judicata and that state law dilution laws are not 
a proper basis for an opposition.43 
Enterprise appealed the decision on two main grounds, arguing 
both that Advantage’s prior use in a limited geographical area should 
                                                          
 32. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 33. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 34. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 35. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 36. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 37. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 38. Id. at 1337, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 39. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 40. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 41. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 42. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (protecting 
famous marks from uses that dilute their distinctiveness). 
 43. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1337-38, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814-15. 
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not prevent the opposition proceeding because Enterprise’s marks 
had since achieved fame44 and that opposition proceedings can be 
based on state dilution law.45  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Board’s decision and determined that neither of Enterprise’s 
arguments were persuasive.46 
Enterprise’s main argument on appeal was that Advantage’s prior 
use in a limited geographical area did not bar Enterprise’s opposition 
proceeding because Enterprise’s marks had achieved fame after 
1999.47  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and instead held 
that “any prior use, even in a limited geographic area, defeats an 
injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) [the dilution statute], and, 
therefore, bars a claim of dilution as a ground for opposition under 
section 1063.”48  This conclusion was supported, in the court’s view, 
by the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), which allows owners of 
famous marks to obtain “an injunction against another person’s 
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use 
begins after the mark has become famous . . . .”49  Because the FTDA 
did not address suits based on limited geographic areas, the court 
found that “such use” referred to any use in commerce.50  To 
successfully claim dilution under the FTDA, the court held that a 
trademark owner must show that its mark was famous prior to any 
use, even uses limited to specific geographic areas.51 
The court extended this analysis to the opposition proceedings, 
noting that section 13 of the Lanham Act,52 the dilution opposition 
provision, incorporated the dilution definition as provided in 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c).53  Specifically, the court stated that “[b]ecause there 
can be no dilution under the FTDA where the allegedly famous mark 
did not achieve fame prior to any use by the accused infringer, there 
can be no opposition based on dilution under such circumstances.”54 
Enterprise also argued that it should be allowed to base its 
opposition on state dilution grounds.55  The Federal Circuit, however, 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 45. Id. at 1344, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 46. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 47. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 48. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
 50. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1342, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 51. See id. at 1343, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (basing this holding on both the 
language of the statute and congressional intent). 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2000) (stating that opposition to registration may be 
based on dilution as defined in Section 1125(c)). 
 53. Enterprise, 330 F.3d at 1343, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 54. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 55. See id. at 1344, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (arguing that the fame of the 
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noted that section 13 of the Lanham Act provides for opposition 
based on the FTDA and makes no mention of state dilution laws as a 
ground for opposition.56  Thus, the court concluded that the 
language and history of the statute did not allow for oppositions 
based on state dilution laws.57 
Enterprise is an important decision because it clearly limits 
trademark owners’ rights to pursue dilution claims.  Although not as 
significant as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moseley v. V. 
Secret Catalogue, Inc.,58 Enterprise similarly saddles trademark owners 
with a high burden to demonstrate dilution.  Practitioners should 
therefore pay close attention to this decision and the prior use, no 
matter how limited, of junior users. 
III. REFURBISHED GOODS 
In Nitro Leisure Products, LLC v. Acushnet Co.,59 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the complex subject of refurbished goods, an area that has 
not received much attention by the Federal Circuit in recent years.  
The Federal Circuit was able to clarify what standards apply and why 
refurbished goods should be treated differently than re-sold new 
goods.60 
The dispute in Nitro began when Acushnet determined that Nitro 
was selling both “recycled” and “refurbished” golf balls originally 
manufactured by Acushnet under the “TITLEIST,” “ACUSHNET,” 
“PINNACLE” and “PRO V1” marks.61  The recycled golf balls were 
used balls in good condition that were simply washed and 
repackaged.  The refurbished golf balls were subjected to a 
procedure that stripped the paint and trademark markings, at which 
point Nitro would reaffix the original manufacturer’s trademark.62  
Nitro also applied the statement “USED & REFURBISHED BY 
SECOND CHANCE” or “USED AND REFURBISHED BY 
GOLFBALLSDIRECT.COM” to each ball.63  Nitro was rather 
                                                          
mark is not determinative in some state dilution statutes). 
 56. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20 (noting legislative history supports 
the conclusion that state laws cannot form the basis of a dilution opposition). 
 57. Id. at 1344-45, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20. 
 58. 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2002) (holding among other things that the FTDA 
requires a showing of actual dilution as opposed to a likelihood of dilution). 
 59. 341 F.3d 1356, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 60. Id. at 1360-65, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-20. 
 61. Id. at 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 62. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 63. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
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successful in its sale of used golf balls, with annual sales of ten million 
dollars in 2001.64 
Nitro initiated the suit and filed a complaint in the Southern 
District of Florida for unfair competition.65  Acushnet responded with 
a suit in the Central District of California alleging patent and 
trademark infringement, as well as trademark dilution.66  The 
California case was eventually consolidated with the Florida case.67  
Acushnet moved for a preliminary injunction regarding only Nitro’s 
sale of the refurbished balls, which the district court denied.68  At 
issue before the Federal Circuit was Acushnet’s appeal of the denial 
of the preliminary injunction on trademark infringement and 
dilution grounds.69 
Acushnet’s main argument on appeal was that the district court 
applied an erroneous standard for trademark infringement.70  
Specifically, Acushnet contended that the district court misapplied 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders71 
and erroneously failed to apply the Eleventh Circuit’s “material 
difference” test, enumerated in Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD 
International Corp.72  Acushnet claimed that the Davidoff decision, if 
properly applied, would have required the district court to analyze 
whether the original and refurbished goods were “materially 
different,” an analysis it claimed would have clearly demonstrated 
that Nitro’s refurbishing activities were unlawful.73 
The court did not agree with Acushnet’s analysis.74  After citing the 
traditional likelihood of confusion factors,75 the court reviewed the 
                                                          
 64. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (noting that, of the $10 million in total 
sales, $4.8 million resulted from the sale of refurbished balls). 
 65. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 66. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 67. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. 
 68. Id. at 1358-59, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. 
 69. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. 
 70. Id. at 1359, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816.  Because this was an appeal from a 
court within the Eleventh Circuit, the court relied on Eleventh Circuit law.  Id., 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816. 
 71. 331 U.S. 125 (1947) (holding that used and refurbished goods may be sold 
under the trademark of the original manufacturer so long as the alleged infringer 
attempts to restore the original condition of the goods and full disclosure is made 
about the true nature of the goods). 
 72. 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a trademark was infringed 
when a party unrelated to the trademark owner sold genuinely trademarked goods in 
altered packaging). 
 73. See Nitro, 341 F.3d at 1361, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817 (noting that 
Acushnet argued that the “material difference” test used to determine the likelihood 
of confusion in the sale of new goods should also be used to determine if a 
trademark has been infringed in the sale of used goods). 
 74. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819-20.  
 75. See id. at 1360, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.  In Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l 
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Champion case.76  In Champion, the Supreme Court noted that sellers 
of used goods may keep the trademark of the original manufacturer 
on the product without deceiving the public if the seller had made all 
possible efforts to restore the product and made full disclosure of the 
product’s condition.77  Although the Court in Champion determined 
that there was no traditional likelihood of confusion on the facts of 
that case,78 it also noted that:  “[c]ases may be imagined where the 
reconditioning or repair would be so extensive or so basic that it 
would be a misnomer to call the article by its original name, even 
though the words ‘used’ or ‘repaired’ were added.”79  The Court held 
that there was no infringement because the defendant in Champion 
did not provide a new design for the product and had only attempted 
to restore the product.80 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the Davidoff “material 
difference” test.81  Unlike Champion, Davidoff involved the limitation 
of resale of new, genuine goods.82  The Davidoff decision examined 
the differences between the resold goods and the original goods, 
which consisted of the obliteration of batch codes on packaging.83  
Davidoff determined that the alterations to the packaging were 
“material differences,” and the defendant was thus liable for 
trademark infringement.84 
After reviewing both Champion and Davidoff, the Federal Circuit 
found that the context of a case—the resale of new goods versus the 
resale of used goods—determined when a court should use the 
Champion analysis as opposed to the Davidoff “material differences” 
                                                          
Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1449 (11th Cir. 
1999), the court adopted the following seven factors to assess the likelihood of 
consumer confusion:  type of mark; similarity of mark; similarity of the products the 
marks represent; similarity of the parties’ retail outlets (trade channels) and 
customers; similarity of advertising media; defendant’s intent; and actual confusion. 
 76. Nitro, 341 F.3d at 1361-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 77. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947) (noting 
that the original manufacturer is not harmed as long as it is not associated with the 
inferior quality of the used goods). 
 78. See id. at 126 (noting that the infringer sold repaired spark plugs with the 
original manufacturer’s brand still affixed to them as well as a “Renewed” label). 
 79. Id. at 129. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that a trademark is infringed when materially different goods are 
sold under that mark because of the resulting consumer confusion). 
 82. See id. at 1299 (alleging that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s trademark 
by reselling its products in the original container with the batch number removed). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 1302-03 (finding that the etching on the bottle where the batch code 
had been was likely to cause consumer confusion). 
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test.85  Although the court acknowledged the importance of the 
Davidoff “material differences” test in the context of resale of new 
goods, the court applied the Champion test in the context of 
refurbished goods:  “whether the used or refurbished goods are so 
different from the original that it would be a misnomer for them to 
be designated by the original trademark.”86  After reviewing the 
district court’s application of the Champion analysis to the facts at 
issue, the court determined that the refurbished golf balls were not 
sufficiently different from original golf balls to warrant a finding of 
trademark infringement.87 
In stark contrast, Judge Newman issued a strong dissent.  Judge 
Newman relied on the damage done by Nitro’s refurbishing process 
and stated that, although Nitro argued that the differences were not 
great, “that is not the issue.  Trademarks are an indication of quality, 
on which the consumer can rely.  The consumer is no less deceived if 
he does not know that the product is inferior, or if the extent of the 
inferiority is not great.”88  Moreover, Judge Newman disagreed with 
the court’s determination that the notice would aid consumers, 
stating that “[w]hen the defects are concealed, that is not ‘full 
disclosure about the true nature’ of the golf balls . . . .  Concealment 
is the antithesis of full disclosure.”89  This, however, was not the view 
of the majority, which felt that while the trademarks were used on the 
refurbished golf balls, they were used on a product that was so 
different that it would not constitute trademark infringement.90 
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In 2003, the Federal Circuit issued several opinions involving 
likelihood of confusion.  While application of the likelihood of 
confusion factors is not groundbreaking, it does provide insight into 
how applicants should proceed in the examination phase. 
A.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.  
In In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.,91 the Federal Circuit explored the 
factors enumerated in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,92 and 
                                                          
 85. See Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that purchasers of used goods 
have different expectations than purchasers of new products). 
 86. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 87. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 88. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 90. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 91. 315 F.3d 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
HORTON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/20/2004  3:24 PM 
920 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:909 
provided more guidance on how to approach a refusal to register 
under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.93 
Majestic Distilling involved Majestic’s attempt to register the mark 
“RED BULL” for tequila.94  Upon review, the examining attorney 
determined that the mark was not registrable because there was a 
likelihood of confusion between “RED BULL” for tequila and the 
registered mark “RED BULL” for Scotch whiskey and malt liquor.95  
Although Majestic successfully petitioned for cancellation of the 
“RED BULL” mark for Scotch whiskey, both the examining attorney 
and the Board, on appeal, found that there was in fact a likelihood of 
confusion between “RED BULL” for tequila and for malt liquor.96 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and addressed each of the 
DuPont likelihood of confusion factors raised by the parties.97  First, 
the court noted that Majestic’s mark was identical to one of the marks 
for use with malt liquor and “almost identical” to another “RED 
BULL” mark.98  Moreover, the court reaffirmed that “when word 
marks are identical but neither suggestive nor descriptive of the 
goods associated with them, the first DuPont factor weighs heavily 
against the applicant.”99  Similarly, because tequila and malt liquor 
are both alcoholic beverages marketed in the same channels of trade, 
the second and third DuPont factors, which refer to the similarity of 
the goods and trade channels, also weighed against Majestic.100 
The court was more thorough in its analysis of the fourth factor, 
sophistication of the purchaser and customer.  The court recognized 
that while both tequila and malt liquor are inexpensive and likely 
                                                          
 92. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
The thirteen Dupont Factors are:  (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in 
their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; 
(2) the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in 
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; 
(3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; 
(4) the conditions under which, and buyers to whom, sales are made; (5) the fame of 
the prior mark; (6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; 
(7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the length of time during, and 
conditions, under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual 
confusion; (9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used; (10) the market 
interface between an applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to 
which an applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; 
(12) the extent of potential confusion; and (13) any other established fact probative 
of the effect of use.   
 93. See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000). 
 94. Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201. 
 95. Id. at 1314, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-03. 
 96. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03. 
 97. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03. 
 98. Id. at 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 99. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 100. Id. at 1316, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
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“impulse” buys, many consumers are very brand-conscious regarding 
alcoholic beverages.101  Ultimately, the court determined that Majestic 
did not provide sufficient evidence to support this likelihood of 
confusion factor, specifically noting the absence of survey data.102 
The court next turned to the fifth and seventh factors, the fame of 
the prior mark and actual confusion.103  The court simply noted 
Majestic’s lack of evidence that the “RED BULL” mark for use with 
malt liquor was not famous and stated that, even if there was such 
evidence, a lack of fame would not preclude a finding of likelihood of 
confusion.104  Similarly, in reference to the seventh factor, the court 
briefly noted that, although there was little evidence of actual 
confusion, such a “lack of evidence carries little weight, especially in 
an ex parte context.”105 
Majestic’s argument apparently relied heavily on the sixth, eighth, 
and tenth factors, which involve the number of similar marks used on 
similar goods, the length of time of concurrent use without actual 
confusion, and the “market interface between the applicant and the 
owner of the prior mark,”106 respectively.  Majestic noted that there 
were no incidents of actual confusion during its use of the “RED 
BULL” mark, which lasted for sixteen years,107 and that the Stroh 
Brewery Company, the owner of the “RED BULL” mark for malt 
liquor, had acknowledged that its mark could be used concurrently 
with the Scotch whiskey mark and had entered into agreements with 
third parties regarding the mark.108  However, these arguments did 
not persuade the court, which found that the agreements between 
the “RED BULL” mark for malt liquor and for Scotch whiskey were 
dated and limited to preclude use of the mark on beer or ale.109 
After methodically reviewing the likelihood of confusion factors at 
issue, the court affirmed the Board’s decision.110  Majestic Distilling is 
thus a study of how the Federal Circuit applies the DuPont factors. 
                                                          
 101. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 102. Id. at 1316-17, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204-05. 
 103. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 104. Id. at 1317, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 105. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (internal citation omitted). 
 106. Id. at 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 107. Id. at 1318, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
 108. Id. at 1317, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 109. See id. at 1318, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205-06 (illustrating how the age of 
an agreement could limit the agreement’s value when using it as a DuPont indicator). 
 110. See id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207 (holding that consumers could be 
mistakenly led to believe that the different products could come from the same 
entity, therefore constituting confusion). 
HORTON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/20/2004  3:24 PM 
922 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:909 
B. In re Coors Brewing Co. 
Courts and the Board often analyze whether different goods or 
services are sufficiently related under the DuPont factors to weigh in 
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In In re Coors Brewing 
Co.,111 the Federal Circuit addressed this issue and reinforced its 
holding that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) must show 
“something more” than that different goods are in the same 
environment to demonstrate that the goods are sufficiently related to 
weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.112 
Unfortunately, the court declined to provide specific examples or 
guidance. 
Coors Brewing involved Coors’s 1998 application for registration of 
the “BLUE MOON and design” mark for use with beer.113  Coors had 
previously applied to register the word mark “BLUE MOON,” but 
registration was refused based on section 2(d) likelihood of 
confusion grounds.114  After the first refusal, Coors combined the 
“BLUE MOON” word mark with a design, which reflected a forest 
scene in the bottom half, the words “Blue Moon” across the center of 
the design, and a large moon covering the majority of the top half of 
the design.115  The words “Blue Moon Brewing Co.” were also present 
at the bottom of the design in small font.116  The examining attorney 
again refused the application, citing a likelihood of confusion with 
the mark “BLUE MOON and Design” for restaurant services and with 
two “BLUE MOON” marks for use with wine.117  The examining 
attorney determined that the marks were similar in sound, 
appearance, and commercial impression and that beer and 
restaurant services were “closely related” because brew pubs often 
provide restaurant services, some restaurants sell private label beer, 
and several third parties had registered marks for both beer and 
restaurant services.118  The examining attorney contended that beer 
and wine are sufficiently related because both products are sold 
through the same channels to the same classes of purchasers.119 
                                                          
 111. In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 112. See id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. 
 113. Id. at 1341, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. 
 114. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. 
 115. Id. at 1344, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 116. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 117. Id. at 1341-42, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060-61. 
 118. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 119. Id. at 1342, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
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Coors promptly appealed the examining attorney’s refusal.120  The 
Board rejected the examining attorney’s determination that beer and 
wine are sufficiently related, but accepted that beer and restaurant 
services are sufficiently related because, as noted by the examining 
attorney, brew pubs often serve as restaurants, some restaurants sell 
private label beer, and some marks have been obtained for both 
restaurant services and beer.121 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Coors contended, among other 
things, that the marks were not similar and that beer and restaurant 
services are not sufficiently related to weigh in favor of finding 
likelihood of confusion.122  The court first addressed whether the two 
marks were similar.  Although both marks included full moons and 
the words “Blue Moon,” the court held that the marks were actually 
“quite different.”123  Because the marks involved significant 
differences, the court determined that similarity was a “less important 
factor” in the likelihood of confusion analysis.124 
The court also examined Coors’s other main argument, i.e., that 
beer and restaurant services are not sufficiently related to weigh in 
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.125  Citing Jacobs v. 
International Multifoods Corp.,126 the court reaffirmed that “‘[t]o 
establish likelihood of confusion a party must show something more 
than that similar or even identical marks are used for food products 
and for restaurant services.’”127  The evidence relied on by the Board, 
which included several references to restaurants providing private 
label beer, articles about brew pubs that brew beer and offer 
restaurant services, and several third-party registrations for beer and 
restaurant services, was not the “something more” required by 
Jacobs.128  Moreover, Coors further demonstrated the lack of 
“something more” by producing evidence that well under one 
percent of restaurants were brew pubs, that there was no evidence 
                                                          
 120. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 121. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 122. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 123. Id. at 1344, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 124. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 125. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.  The court also affirmed the Board’s 
finding that the “Blue Moon” mark was not weak and determined that the large 
number of third-party uses prevented the mark from being considered strong.  Id. at 
1345, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062-63. 
 126. 668 F.2d 1234, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that just 
because restaurants serve food and beverages does not mean that all food and 
beverages are related to restaurant services for purposes of likelihood of confusion). 
 127. Coors, 343 F.3d at 1345, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (quoting Jacobs, 668 
F.2d at 1236) (emphasis in original). 
 128. Id. at 1346, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
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that a significant amount of restaurants offered private label beer, 
and that it was actually unusual for one mark to be registered for 
both beer and restaurants.129  The court thus reversed the Board’s 
decision upholding the examining attorney’s refusal and remanded 
the case for consideration consistent with the opinion.130 
This opinion reaffirms the Jacobs test and also provides much-
needed examples of the amorphous “something more” standard.131  
While the court failed to provide more specific guidance, 
practitioners can look to Coors Brewing to assess the quantum of 
evidence necessary to overcome a section 2(d) likelihood of 
confusion based on a perceived similarity of services. 
V. GEOGRAPHICALLY DECEPTIVELY MISDESCRIPTIVENESS 
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in a pair of cases involving 
geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness are among the most 
important trademark decisions of 2003.  These decisions reshaped 
the standard for geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness in 
light of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and 
its implementing legislation.132  Although earlier post-NAFTA Federal 
Circuit decisions employed the pre-NAFTA standard,133 in these cases 
the Federal Circuit clearly laid down a new standard by which 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks should be judged. 
A.  In re California Innovations, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit first addressed the interplay between 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks and NAFTA in In re 
California Innovations, Inc.134  The applicant in California Innovations 
filed an intent-to-use application for “CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS” 
in reference to various products, including automobile visor 
organizers and backpacks.135  Although the examining attorney 
allowed the mark to be published for opposition, the PTO 
                                                          
 129. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 130. Id. at 1347, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064. 
 131. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064. 
 132. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605; NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 103-159, at 154 (1993).   
 133. In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); see In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 134. 329 F.3d 1334, 1340-41, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853, 1857-58 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 135. Id. at 1336, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
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subsequently reasserted jurisdiction and refused registration on the 
basis that the mark was geographically deceptively misdescriptive.136 
Prior to NAFTA, sections 2(e) and (f) of the Lanham Act allowed 
both primarily geographically descriptive and deceptively 
misdescriptive marks to be registered on the Supplemental Register, 
and, upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness, on the Principal 
Register.137  Furthermore, the test for geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks required a showing that the primary 
significance of the mark was a generally known geographic location 
and that the public likely would think that the goods came from that 
location, when, in fact, the goods originated from a different area.138  
This test thus included the so-called “goods-place” association 
requirement.139 
The Federal Circuit determined that “NAFTA and its 
implementing legislation obliterated the distinction between 
geographically deceptive marks and primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks.”140  Specifically, the court 
determined that the NAFTA amendments prohibited geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive marks from registration, regardless of 
acquired distinctiveness.141  Because the PTO can no longer rely on 
lack of distinctiveness as the basis for refusal, the court found that the 
PTO must instead demonstrate that geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks are, in fact, deceptive.142  The court stated that 
the PTO now must also show that the goods-place association is 
material to the consumer’s purchasing decision.143  To deny 
registration on geographically deceptively misdescriptiveness 
grounds, the PTO must therefore show: 
                                                          
 136. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 137. Id. at 1337, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.  The Principal Register is the 
primary registry of trademarks maintained by the PTO.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 
(2000).  In order to qualify for registration on the Principal Register, a trademark 
must be distinctive and currently in use.  See id. § 1052(c).  Certain marks which are 
not eligible for registration on the Principal Register, but which are capable of 
distinguishing an applicant’s goods or services, are registered at the PTO on the 
Supplemental Register.  See id. §§ 1091-1096.  Those marks which are registered on 
the Supplemental Register are excluded from receiving the advantages of certain 
sections of the Trademark Act of 1946.  See id. § 1094. 
 138. California Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1340, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
 139. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (describing the “goods-place 
association” as the association between the goods in question and location where the 
potential confusion could occur). 
 140. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856. 
 141. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856. 
 142. Id. at 1340, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
 143. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857-58 (noting that this newly heightened 
test of materiality inquiry “equates this test with the elevated standard applied under 
§ 1052(a)”). 
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(1) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known 
geographic location; (2) the consuming public is likely to believe 
the place identified by the mark indicates the origin of the goods 
bearing the mark, when in fact the goods do not come from that 
place; and (3) the misrepresentation was a material factor in the 
consumer’s decision.144 
Because the Board had not applied this new test, the court 
remanded the case.145 
The court recognized that it had issued two decisions regarding 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks since NAFTA without 
providing a new test.146  The court, however, determined that those 
two decisions also satisfied the new post-NAFTA test because they 
both discussed the relationship between the geographic locations at 
issue and the products.147 
B.  In re Les Halles de Paris J.V. 
Only two months later, the Federal Circuit applied its new test to 
services and placed a higher burden on the PTO to demonstrate that 
a mark was unregistrable as geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
in the services context.  In In re Les Halles de Paris J.V.,148 the court was 
faced with the PTO’s decision to refuse registration of the mark “LE 
MARAIS” for restaurant services.149  Both the examining attorney and 
the Board determined that the mark was geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive based on the pre-California Innovations standard.150  
The Board relied on evidence that a Jewish quarter of Paris is known 
as “Le Marais” and found that, especially in light of Les Halles’ use of 
the term in relation to a French restaurant, consumers were likely to 
associate the restaurant with the “Le Marais” region of Paris.151  The 
Board specifically noted that it was not making a finding that the “Le 
Marais” neighborhood was known for cuisine.152 
On appeal, the court determined that the second prong of the 
California Innovations analysis would have to be modified in the 
services context.153  In the context of goods, the California Innovations 
test allows an inference that the consumer associates the product with 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 145. Id. at 1342-43, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 146. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856. 
 147. Id. at 1340-41, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
 148. 334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 149. Id. at 1372, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540. 
 150. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540. 
 151. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540. 
 152. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1540. 
 153. Id. at 1373-74, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42. 
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the geographic location if consumers identify the geographic location 
as a known source of the product.154  Because consumers generally 
receive services at the business itself, they are more likely to be aware 
that the services do not originate in the geographic location of the 
mark, thereby rendering the inference inapplicable with regard to 
services.155  The court therefore held that, when dealing with services, 
the PTO “must show that patrons will likely be misled to make some 
meaningful connection between the restaurant (the service) and the 
relevant place.”156  Examples include evidence that consumers 
thought that the food was imported from the “Le Marais” region or 
that the restaurant’s chefs received specialized training in the “Le 
Marais” region, among other things.157 
The court also noted that the PTO must demonstrate the third 
prong of the California Innovations analysis:  that the misleading 
services-place association is material.158  To satisfy the materiality 
prong, the court stated that the PTO must make “some heightened 
association between the services and the relevant geographic 
denotation.”159  The court noted that “an inference of materiality 
arises in the event of a very strong services-place association.”160  
Without a very strong services-place association, the PTO must 
present direct evidence of materiality.161  Since the Board did not 
apply the heightened standard for geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive goods, the court remanded the case.162 
VI. MERE DESCRIPTIVENESS 
The Federal Circuit also issued one published and several 
unpublished decisions focusing on the issue of mere descriptiveness; 
namely, In re MBNA America Bank, N.A.,163 In re Dayan,164 In re Anylens 
Acquisition, LLC,165 and In re Savin Corp.166  MBNA America Bank and 
Dayan involved a traditional distinction between descriptive and 
suggestive marks,167 while both Anylens and Savin involved the use of 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 1374, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542. 
 155. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542. 
 156. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541. 
 157. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42. 
 158. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542. 
 159. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542. 
 160. Id. at 1375, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1542. 
 161. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42. 
 162. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42. 
 163. 340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 164. No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003). 
 165. Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003 WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003). 
 166. No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003). 
 167. MBNA America Bank, 340 F.3d at 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780; Dayan, 
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Internet terms such as “com” and “net” as descriptive portions of 
proposed marks.168  Anylens also dealt with geographic terms used on 
the Internet.169 
A. In re MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
MBNA America Bank focused on the distinction between descriptive 
and suggestive marks in the registration process.170  MBNA filed two 
intent-to-use applications for “MONTANA SERIES” and 
“PHILADELPHIA CARD” in connection with credit card services.171  
The examining attorney refused to register the marks as merely 
descriptive of MBNA’s goods and services.172  The Board affirmed, 
noting that MBNA’s credit cards could be categorized as “regional 
affinity” cards, which attempt to appeal to customers in particular 
geographic regions.173  Since the marks described the region, and 
hence a significant feature of MBNA’s services, the Board agreed that 
the marks were merely descriptive and thus unregistrable.174 
MBNA appealed, claiming that the marks were suggestive, but the 
Federal Circuit found its arguments unpersuasive.175  MBNA claimed 
that the “MONTANA SERIES” and “PHILADELPHIA CARD” marks 
were either arbitrary or suggestive because they did not immediately 
convey credit card information, such as interest rates and the annual 
fee.176  The court found that the marks described regional pride and 
loyalty, which are significant features of “regional affinity” cards.177  
The Federal Circuit thus agreed with the Board’s determination that 
the marks were merely descriptive in regard to MBNA’s credit card 
services.178 
Chief Judge Mayer issued a dissenting opinion, observing that 
MBNA was attempting to register the marks for credit card services, 
not credit cards with scenes of Montana or Philadelphia.179 
                                                          
2003 WL 932442, at *1. 
 168. Anylens, 2003 WL 1194293, at *1; Savin, 2003 WL 21316775, at **1-3. 
 169. Anylens, 2003 WL 1194293, at *2. 
 170. MBNA America Bank, 340 F.3d at 1329, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779-80. 
 171. Id. at 1331, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 172. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 173. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 174. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779-81. 
 175. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 176. Id. at 1333, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 177. Id. at 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 178. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 179. Id. at 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the evidence does not support the finding that the relevant marks are merely 
descriptive of recited services). 
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B. In re Dayan 
In the unpublished decision In re Dayan,180 the court was faced with 
an intent-to-use application for the mark “BABY GOLF” for “clothing, 
namely newborn, infant and toddler shirts, one-piece outfits, 
coveralls, pants and dresses.”181  The examining attorney refused the 
registration as merely descriptive, and the Board agreed, affirming 
the refusal.182  The Board noted that the word “baby,” which was 
disclaimed apart from the entire mark, was obviously descriptive and 
that Dayan’s category was sufficiently broad to include so-called “golf 
shirts.”183 
On appeal, Dayan contended that despite selling polo shirts, the 
Board lacked substantial evidence that polo shirts are also known as 
“golf shirts.”184  The court concurred with the Board, noting that 
Dayan’s identification of goods was broad enough to cover “golf-style 
clothing” and “golf shirts.”185  The court also found that the Board did 
rely on substantial evidence for the proposition that polo shirts are 
also commonly known as golf shirts, including a catalogue sheet for 
golf shirts and a magazine article.186 
Dayan also argued that the “BABY GOLF” mark was incongruous 
and thus not merely suggestive.187  Dayan claimed that “BABY GOLF” 
was incongruous because the idea of babies playing golf is, in fact, a 
fanciful notion.188  The court disagreed and determined that no 
“mental pause” was required to understand that “BABY GOLF” is for 
golf-styled clothing for babies.189 
C. In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC 
In another unpublished decision, In re Anylens Acquisition, LLC,190 
the Federal Circuit addressed Anylens’s intent-to-use application for 
“NATIONAL CONTACTS.COM” and “NATIONAL CONTACT 
                                                          
 180. No. 02-1473, 2003 WL 932442 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2003). 
 181. Id. at *1. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at **1-2. 
 187. See id. at *6.  Incongruity is a concept commonly used by the Board and 
federal courts to explain the often-difficult determination of whether a mark is 
merely descriptive or suggestive.  Id.  Incongruity simply encompasses the idea that, 
when a term includes certain words not commonly used together, thus requiring 
imagination and “mental pause,” the term is more likely suggestive, rather than 
descriptive.  Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at *7. 
 190. Nos. 02-1493, 02-1494, 2003 WL 1194293 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2003). 
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LENSES.COM” for “on-line retail store services, mail order services, 
and retail stores featuring contact lenses, eyeglasses, and 
accessories.”191  The examining attorney refused to register either 
mark on descriptiveness grounds.192  The Board affirmed, stating that 
the marks immediately conveyed information about Anylens’s 
services because “contacts” and “contact lenses” described some of 
Anylens’s services, the term “national” extended beyond the 
geographic boundaries in which the services were offered, and the 
term “.com” was a mere reference to a top level domain 
designation.193 
Anylens disputed the Board’s finding on several grounds.  First, 
Anylens claimed that the Board inappropriately “dissect[ed]” the 
marks instead of viewing them in their entirety.194  The Federal 
Circuit, however, held that to determine descriptiveness, it is 
appropriate to discern the meaning of the individual words that 
comprise the mark.195  Moreover, when viewing the words together, 
the court found that the mark was still merely descriptive.196 
Anylens’s next contention was that the term “national” did not 
describe the geographic scope of its services.197  Instead, Anylens 
claimed that it used the term “national” to identify itself with the 
nation.198  Again, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument.  The 
court stated that, while the source of Anylens’s goods may not be 
national, the goods may be available nationwide.199  The court noted 
that Anylens did not dispute the nationwide scope of its services and 
that registration under the Lanham Act provides “nationwide 
exclusivity” for the mark.200 
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Anylens’s creative argument 
that the terms “.com” and “national” are incongruous because “.com” 
describes a worldwide scope whereas “national” is more 
geographically limited.201  The definition of “.com,” in the court’s 
view, involves a commercial organization and not a geographic 
scope.202  Because the two terms did not represent conflicting 
                                                          
 191. Id. at *1. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at *3. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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geographic scopes, the court refused to hold that they were 
incongruous.203  The court thus affirmed the Board’s findings.204 
D. In re Savin Corp. 
In re Savin Corp.205 is yet another unpublished decision involving the 
descriptiveness of a mark.  Savin filed an intent-to-use application for 
“SAVIN NET” for a “computer software system for processing parts 
and supplies orders via a real-time on-line system, namely, software 
generating a graphical user interface that is downloadable by 
customers for use in communicating with the vendor” and 
“computerized on-line ordering services in the field of office 
machinery and equipment.”206  The examining attorney required that 
Savin disclaim “NET” because it was merely descriptive of on-line 
systems.207  In response, Savin contended that “NET” was not 
descriptive because its services were provided through phone lines 
and not a global network.208  The examining attorney maintained that 
the mark was merely descriptive and relied on on-line dictionaries 
stating that “NET” refers to networks connected by telephones and 
Savin’s own brochure, which referenced its “on-line” system.209 
When Savin appealed, the Board upheld the examining attorney’s 
disclaimer requirement.210  The Board relied on the dictionary 
definitions and noted that Savin’s system was for the transmission of 
data over phone lines, thus rendering the “NET” portion of the mark 
merely descriptive.211 
On appeal, the court reiterated that to be merely descriptive, a 
mark “‘would immediately convey to one seeing or hearing it the 
thought of appellant’s services.’”212  The dictionary definitions along 
with Savin’s brochure description convinced the court that the “NET” 
portion of the mark did immediately convey part of Savin’s services.213  
The court also rejected Savin’s argument that, because the term “net” 
has several meanings, it could not immediately convey information 
about the company’s services.214  Instead, the court noted that, while 
                                                          
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *4. 
 205. No. 03-1094, 2003 WL 21316775 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003). 
 206. Id. at *1. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at *2. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (quoting In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 159, 229 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 818, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 213. Id. at *3. 
 214. Id. 
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there are various types of networks, they are all networks and any 
other definition of “net” was irrelevant to Savin’s services.215 
VII.   INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS 
Courts have struggled with the scope of inherently distinctive trade 
dress since Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.216 changed the legal 
landscape and subjected trade dress to the traditional distinctiveness 
factors.217  In In re Pacer Technology,218 the Federal Circuit addressed the 
PTO’s evidentiary burden in showing that a particular trade dress is 
not inherently distinctive.219  Specifically, the court analyzed whether 
the PTO must show evidence that consumers actually associated the 
trade dress with the applicant.220 
The applicant in Pacer applied to register a specific design for a 
container cap.221  After reviewing the design, the examining attorney 
issued a non-final action finding that the design was not inherently 
distinctive.222  In response, Pacer produced five consumer affidavits 
claiming that the cap design indicated Pacer as the source.223  The 
examining attorney continued to refuse the registration and 
included, as further support, ten registered U.S. design patents with 
designs similar to Pacer’s.224 
Pacer appealed the examining attorney’s refusal to the Board, 
which affirmed.225  The Board explained that the design patent 
evidence was “probative of the fact that consumers are not likely to 
find applicant’s claimed feature . . . to be at all unique, original or 
peculiar in appearance.”226  The fact that several of the design patents 
were registered by Pacer’s competitors further bolstered the Board’s 
decision.227 
                                                          
 215. Id. at *4. 
 216. 505 U.S. 763, 776, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1086 (1992) (holding that 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not require “proof of secondary meaning . . . 
where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive”). 
 217. See id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (explaining the general rule to 
determine distinctiveness:  “An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being 
protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness 
through secondary meaning.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 218. 338 F.3d 1348, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 219. Id. at 1349, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 220. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631-32. 
 221. Id. at 1349, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 222. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 223. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 224. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 225. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 226. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 227. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
HORTON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/20/2004  3:24 PM 
2004] 2003 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 933 
The main issue on appeal was whether the PTO established a prima 
facie case of lack of inherent distinctiveness, or, instead, whether the 
PTO was required to show that the patented designs were actually 
used in the relevant market.228  In light of its decisions in In re Loew’s 
Theatres, Inc.229 and In re Gyulay,230 the court determined that the PTO 
must only show a “reasonable predicate” that the patented designs 
were advertised, sold, or used, not that there was actual use.231  The 
court noted that the PTO does not have the resources to show actual 
use, which would likely require expensive evidence such as consumer 
surveys.232  Instead, the court found that the applicant was in the 
better position to demonstrate lack of actual use when attempting to 
rebut the PTO’s prima facie case.233 
The court determined that Pacer failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to rebut the PTO’s prima facie case.234  Pacer only provided 
five consumer affidavits, all of which were very similar and conclusory 
and none of which explained why Pacer’s cap design was distinct 
from designs on competing products.235  The court therefore affirmed 
the Board and the examining attorney’s refusal to register the 
container cap.236 
VIII.   MONETARY DAMAGES 
The Federal Circuit decided two trademark cases in 2003 involving 
monetary damages.237  Both of these decisions held that the district 
courts had abused their discretion in awarding certain damages 
under the Lanham Act and modified or reversed those awards. 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 229. 769 F.2d 764, 767-68, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(affirming the PTO’s denial to register “DURANGO” as a mark for chewing tobacco, 
when such a mark would be “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive”). 
 230. 820 F.2d 1216, 1218, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1009, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the term “APPLE PIE,” used to describe the scent of potpourri, was not 
registrable under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act because “APPLE PIE” is merely 
descriptive of the scent of the potpourri and did not convey any “secondary 
meaning”). 
 231. Pacer, 338 F.3d at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 232. Id. at 1352, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 233. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632-33. 
 234. Id. at 1353, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 235. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 236. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 237. Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072 (Fed. Cir. 
May 1, 2003); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
HORTON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 6/20/2004  3:24 PM 
934 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:909 
A. Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc. 
In the first of these cases, Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc., an 
unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit took a big “bite” out of the 
district court’s damages award.238  This case involved the defendants’ 
continued distribution, after the plaintiff’s termination of 
defendants’ distributorship, of plaintiff’s artificial fangs under the 
“PROFESSIONAL FANGTASTICS” mark.239  The plaintiff, Donald 
Nutting, sued the defendants for false designation of origin under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,240 among other things.241  After a 
jury found the defendants liable for false designation of origin, the 
district court trebled all of the jury’s Lanham Act damages awards.242  
More specifically, the lower court awarded the defendants’ profits, 
trebled, plus the cost of corrective advertising, trebled, as damages 
for the Lanham Act violations, along with attorney’s fees, costs, and 
prejudgment interest.243 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s post-verdict 
award of the defendants’ profits, trebled, constituted an abuse of 
discretion and modified the award.244  The court first noted that 
section 35(a) of the Lanham Act245 does not expressly provide for the 
trebling of an award of defendants’ profits, but only for an award of 
treble the plaintiff’s “actual damages.”246  The court then observed 
that, under applicable Tenth Circuit law,247 the sole fact that 
defendants’ actions were willful was insufficient to invoke the court’s 
more general power to remedy an “inadequate” recovery under 
section 35 of the Lanham Act because a showing of willfulness was a 
prerequisite to an award of any of the defendants’ profits.248 
B. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp. 
The second of these cases presented a much more straightforward 
issue.  In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.,249 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether an award of monetary sanctions against 
                                                          
 238. No. 02-1361, 2003 WL 2008072, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2003). 
 239. Id. at *1. 
 240. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 241. See Nutting, 2003 WL 2008072, at *2 (noting that the plaintiff also sued for 
infringement of trade dress and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act). 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. (noting that the total amount of the award came to over $1.1 million). 
 244. Id. at *4. 
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 246. Nutting, 2003 WL 2008072, at *3. 
 247. Id. (discussing controlling Tenth Circuit case law as it relates to the review of 
damage awards). 
 248. Id. at *5. 
 249. 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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trademark plaintiffs was appropriate under section 35 of the Lanham 
Act.250  The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ trademark 
claims and awarded sanctions against the plaintiffs because they did 
not yet possess a federally registered trademark when they filed their 
action alleging infringement of their mark “BATTSCAN.”251  In 
reversing this award, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
misunderstood the governing law and thus abused its discretion in 
awarding sanctions.252  The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had sued 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides a remedy for 
unregistered, as well as registered marks, and sanctions for this suit 
were therefore inappropriate.253 
IX. INSUFFICIENCY OF USE 
One unpublished case in 2003, Lowell International Co. v. Quimby,254 
discussed the common question of sufficiency of use:  when has an 
applicant made enough trademark use to establish priority for 
purposes of an opposition?255  In Lowell, the applicant sought 
registration of “1-800-REFERRAL” for certain information-related 
services and William Quimby opposed on likelihood of confusion 
grounds.256  The parties stipulated as to likelihood of confusion; the 
only issue was priority of use.257  In sustaining Quimby’s opposition, 
the Board observed that Lowell produced only two solicitation letters 
as evidence of use.258  Although testimony of a single witness (here 
applicant) could sometimes be probative, the Board found the 
applicant’s testimony as to his continuous use of his mark to be 
“inconsistent, contradictory and vague.”259  Reviewing the Board’s 
findings of fact under the “substantial evidence” standard, the 
Federal Circuit agreed with these findings.260  Thus, the court’s 
                                                          
 250. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). 
 251. See Waymark, 334 F.3d at 1360-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305-07. 
 252. See id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (noting further that its reversal 
of the district court’s decision was not intended as a criticism since Waymark’s 
briefing on the matter “was at best confusing”). 
 253. See id. at 1363-64, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08. 
 254. No. 02-1392, 2003 WL 21318662 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2003). 
 255. Id. at *3. 
 256. Id. at *1. 
 257. See id. (explaining that in determining priority of use, the Board sought to 
resolve whether Lowell could prove that he used his “1-800-REFERRAL” mark before 
Quimby first used his similar mark in May 1997). 
 258. See id. at *2 (pointing out that these solicitation letters, to the Dental Society 
of New York and the Florida Bar, did not result in any form of participation 
agreement). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at *3. 
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decision signaled the importance of corroborating evidence when 
establishing priority of use. 
X. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
In addition to tackling numerous substantive matters, the Federal 
Circuit also clarified procedural points in two cases that criticized the 
Board’s handling of some technical issues and approved of its 
handling of others. 
A. Custom Computer Services, Inc. v. Paychex Properties, Inc. 
In Custom Computer Services, Inc. v. Paychex Properties, Inc.,261 the 
Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had properly 
interpreted and applied the federal regulation governing untimely 
filed oppositions.262  In this case, the would-be opposer, The Payroll 
People, Inc., filed two extensions of time to oppose registration of the 
mark “PAY-AS-YOU-GO.”263  Although these extensions were granted, 
Payroll People’s counsel mistakenly filed its extensions on behalf of 
“Custom Computer Services, Inc.” formerly known as Payroll People, 
when Payroll People had not, in fact, changed its name or previously 
been known as Custom Computer Services, Inc.264  When Payroll 
People finally filed an opposition, the Board rejected it, holding that 
Payroll People should not have the benefit of the granted extensions 
because its counsel’s error was not the sort of “mistake” in the “form 
of the potential opposer’s name” that, according to 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.102(b), would allow a party wrongly identified in an extension 
request to pursue an opposition.265 
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the Board improperly 
interpreted section 2.102(b).266  The court began by quoting the 
regulation in its entirety, specifically noting that, with respect to 
requests for extension of time to file an opposition, the potential 
opposer’s failure to provide its “name” may be excused if the failure 
was the result of “misidentifi[cation] through mistake” or if the 
“opposition is filed in the name of a person in privity with the person 
                                                          
 261. 337 F.3d 1334, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 262. See id. at 1336-37, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640. 
 263. Id. at 1335, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 264. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639 (explaining that while the two 
companies were separate entities, one of Payroll People’s founders was also the 
owner of Custom Computer). 
 265. Id. at 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 266. See id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (noting that while the Board’s 
interpretation of the term “mistake” was reasonable, its application of that 
interpretation in the instant case was not supported by substantial evidence). 
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who requested and was granted the extension of time.”267  The court 
determined that section 2.102(b)’s use of the disjunctive “or” meant 
that the potential opposer need not demonstrate both that its name 
was misidentified by mistake and that it was in privity with the named 
potential opposer.268  Since the Board had required Payroll People to 
show privity and had not pointed to any evidence that there was 
misidentification through mistake, the court reversed.269 
B. Central Manufacturing Co. v. Casablanca Industries, Inc. 
The hotly contested case Central Manufacturing Co. v. Casablanca 
Industries, Inc.270 entailed a number of procedural and substantive 
issues.  Here, Central Manufacturing filed a petition for cancellation 
of the “STEALTH” mark for ceiling fans while the original registrant 
was in bankruptcy.271  Before the petition was answered, Central filed 
a motion for summary judgment.272  Shortly thereafter, the Hunter 
Fan Company acquired the “STEALTH” registration and moved for 
an extension of time to answer the petition.273  At this point, the 
Board suspended proceedings due to the pending summary 
judgment motion, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d).274  Although 
Central filed a motion for default and another summary judgment 
motion, the Board denied both and required Central to file an 
amended petition.275  After Central filed its amended petition, it again 
moved for default after Hunter filed its answer.276  Hunter replied 
with sworn affidavits that the parties had agreed that Hunter could 
file at a later time.277  While Central contested this characterization, 
the Board ultimately denied the default motion.278  More motions 
followed, eventually leading the Board to require that Central seek 
leave before filing more pretrial motions.279  Additionally, Central’s 
four notices of reliance eventually were excluded on evidentiary 
                                                          
 267. Id. at 1336-37, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640. 
 268. Id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640. 
 269. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640. 
 270. No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 22977469 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003) (per curiam). 
 271. Id. at *1. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2002) (providing that “When a party files . . . 
a motion for summary judgment, or any other motion which is potentially dispositive 
of a proceeding, the case will be suspended by the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board with respect to all matters not germane to the motion . . . .”). 
 275. See Central, 2003 WL 22977469, at *1 (indicating that the amended petition 
required a greater degree of specificity). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at *2. 
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grounds.280  Based on the lack of evidence in the record, the Board 
denied Central’s cancellation petition.281 
The Federal Circuit approved of the Board’s rulings regarding the 
cancellation proceeding.282  The court first held that the Board 
correctly excluded the notices of reliance because they included 
unauthenticated evidence as well as hearsay.283  Next, the court 
rejected Central’s argument that the Board applied strict procedural 
rules to Central and lenient rules to Hunter regarding Central’s 
various motions and evidentiary issues.284  Central’s argument that 
Hunter provided insufficient evidence of prior use and lack of 
likelihood of confusion was rejected because the court found that 
Central “misapprehend[ed]” the burden of proof.285  Finally, the 
court held that the Board correctly determined that the “STEALTH” 
mark was suggestive and that the requirement that Central seek leave 
prior to filing further motions was proper.286 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in 2003 provided practitioners with 
both new precedent and guidelines regarding long-standing 
standards.  While most of the decisions remained loyal to precedent, 
the opinions regarding scandalous and geographically 
misdescriptively deceptive marks marked important changes.  The 
Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions have thus provided important 
substantive guidance for trademark lawyers and their clients. 
                                                          
 280. See id. (explaining that the court excluded the evidence as untimely because 
it was proffered during the rebuttal instead of being properly introduced during the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at *3. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at *4. 
